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Gibson: Constitutional Law--Freedom of Speech: Property Rights Triumphant

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH: PROPERTY
RIGHTS TRIUMPHANT IN THE SHOPPING CENTER*
Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976)
Striking union members picketed the front of their employer's leased
store located within the enclosed mall of a suburban shopping center., The
picketers departed after being threatened with arrest for criminal trespass
by the manager of the shopping center. Subsequently, the union filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). 2 Finding that the union had no other reasonable access to its
target audience, the Board entered a cease and desist order against further
interference with the picketing.3 Affirming the NLRB ruling, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied a first amendment standard to determine
that the striking employees had a right under section seven of the National
4
Labor Relations Act to conduct picketing in the shopping center. On
EDITOR'S NOTE: This case comment was awarded the George IF. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the spring 1976 quarter.
1. The union members were employees of the Butler Shoe Co. chain whose retail
outlet was located in the mall. The picketers were employed at a warehouse not situated
in the mall. The employees of Butler's store in the shopping center were non-union.
Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1973).
2. This charge was filed against the shopping center owner. While the owner of the mall
was not the employer of the picketers involved in the case, Justice Stewart noted that
he was clearly a statutory employer within the meaning of §§2(6) and (7) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§152(6)-(7) (1970). 96 S. Ct. 1029, 1032 n.3 (1976).
The union charged that the threat of arrest violated §8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§158(a)(1) (1970), which provides that interference by an employer with the exercise of
employee rights guaranteed by §7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §157 (1970), is an unfair labor
practice. 96 S. Ct. at 1032. Section 7, 29 U.S.C. §157 (1970) provides in part: "Employees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor unions, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
"
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining ..
3. Hudgens v. Local 315, AFL-CIO, 205 N.L.R.B. 628 (1973). The right of the union
to picket in the shopping mall was upheld as protected activity under §7 of the NLRA
as judged by the criteria of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (sec
note 23 inIra). This was the second NLRB ruling on the case. On the first hearing, the
NLRB held that the union had a first amendment right to picket at its chosen location,
relying on Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968). Hudgens v. Local 315, AFL-CIO, 192 N.L.R.B. 671 (1971). While a petition
for review was pending with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
decided Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) and Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,
407 U.S. 539 (1972). The case was remanded to the NLRB for reconsideration in light of
these decisions. Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1974).
4. Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974). The court determined that the
private property rights of the shopping center owner should be required to yield to
the §7 rights of the picketers since the object of the protest related to the use of the
shopping center and since there existed no reasonably effective alternate means of communication to reach the union's desired audience. Id. at 169. The Court of Appeals recognized
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certiorari the United States Supreme Court vacated this decision and HELD,
the first amendment guarantee of free expression has no application when
union picketers seek to enter a privately owned shopping center to advertise
a strike.5
There are two extremes along the spectrum for classifying a particular
location as an appropriate forum for the exercise of first amendment rights.
The exercise of free expression may be completely restricted by the owner
8
of private property used exclusively for private purposes. On the other hand,
citizens generally have free access to public property for use as a first amendment forum7 subject only to reasonable regulation in the interest of the
public health, safety, and welfare. 8 The desirability of maintaining the sharp
that §7 rights are not necessarily coextensive with first amendment rights. The test used
to decide the case, however, was derived from Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972),
in which the Supreme Court had dealt solely with the scope of first amendment rights
in shopping centers. Reliance on this case was justified on the ground that Lloyd best
isolated the relevant factors for determining when private property rights of a shopping
center owner are subordinate to §7 rights. Id. at 167.
5. 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976). The Court determined that union picketing rights on private
property depend exclusively on rights granted under the NLRA. Id. at 1037.
6. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 US. 622 (1951) (upholding the enforcement of
trespass laws to bar uninvited solicitors from private residences); Hall v. Commonwealth,
335 U.S. 875 (1948) (private owner of an apartment house may exclude handbillers).
7. The courts have not dearly delineated the precise extent of a citizen's access to
public property for the exercise of first amendment rights. But it does appear that access
is greatest when the public property sought to be used is a traditional public forum
such as streets, sidewalks, and parks. In such places, speech interests must be accommodated
even at the cost of some interference with other uses of the public property. Thus, a
complete ban on expressive activities in a traditional public forum is constitutionally impermissible. See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 US. 415 (1971) (upholding the right to conduct handbilling on sidewalks); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147 (1939) (pamphletting must be allowed on a city street even if alternate sites are
available). Courts adhering to this view have found implicit in the first amendment
a guarantee of minimum access to these forums for free expression. Id.
Access to property not classified as a traditional public forum, however, is more restricted.
No accommodation for speech purposes need be made where there is interference with
other uses of the public property. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 US. 89 (1966) (grounds
of a jail not generally open to the public for free expression). Despite the limited access
to these areas, any prohibition based on regulation of the contents of the message sought
to be conveyed violates the equal protection clause. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating a municipal 'ordinance that allowed labor picketing on public
school grounds but banned all other 'expressive activities). Therefore, the first amendment
guarantees only a right of equal access to public property not traditionally associated with
the exercise of free speech.
The "equal access" and "minimum access" doctrines described above are treated
extensively in Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First
Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975).
8. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana (I), 379 US. 536 (1965) (traffic regulation was a
sufficiently important interest to justify curtailment of expressive activities); Cox v. Louisiana
(11), 379 US. 559 (1965) (overriding public interest in preventing interference with the
functioning of a courthouse); Feiner v. New York, 340 US. 315 (1951) (primacy of the
public interest in enjoining the use of fighting words); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)
(noise regulation not violative of first amendment rights); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
US. 296 (1940) (state may reasonably regulate time, place, and conduct of soliciting and
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distinction between public and private property for first amendment purposes
has been the subject of much constitutional debate as the suburban shopping
center has displaced the city center as the focus of community economic and
social activityf This development has caused the ownership of the community
10
business district, long associated with the exercise of first amendment rights,
to pass increasingly from public to private hands." Consequently, there has
been concern that first amendment guarantees could be seriously jeopardized
12
by a lack of effective forums for free expression in the suburbs,
The United States Supreme Court, in Marsh v. Alabama," first recognized
that private property may be treated as public for first amendment purposes
under certain circumstances. In Marsh a woman arrested while distributing
religious literature in the business district of a company town challenged14
the constitutionality of her conviction under a state criminal trespass statute.
The Supreme Court rejected at the outset the argument that private ownership of property could solely justify the curtailment of first amendment
rights in a company town.' 5 Instead, the majority based its opinion on the
precept that first amendment guarantees occupy a preferred position in the
16
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights.
In concluding that the facts of the case required private property rights
to yield to first amendment guarantees, the Court considered the characteristics
and use of the property and the significant public interest in having the
channels of communication remain open. The Marsh Court first found the
meetings on public roads). See generally Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REy. 1.
9. See generally Forkosch, Picketing in Shopping Centers, 26 WAsH. &: LEE L. REv.
250 (1969); Comment, Free Speech on Private Property, 19 CL.Ev. ST. L. REV. 372 (1970).
10. "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens." Hague v'.CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
11. One estimate placed the number of shopping centers in the United States at
13,000, accounting for 40% of retail sales not including automobiles and building materials.
74 CHAIN STORE AGE, Feb. 1971, at 26.
12. "As governments rely on private enterprise, public property decreases in favor
of privately owned property. It becomes harder and harder for citizens to find means to
communicate with other citizens. Only the wealthy may find effective communication
possible .... When there are no effective means of communication, free speech is a mere
shibboleth." Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 586 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also Henely, Property Rights and First Amendment Rights: Balance and Conflict, 62
A.B.A.J. 77 (1976).
13. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See generally Comment, Constitutional Law - Freedom of
Speech and Religion - What Constitutes State Action, 44 MICH. L. REv. 848 (1946); Comment.
Freedom of Speech in a Company-Owned Town, 1 Wyo. L.J. 142 (1947).
14. 326 U.S. at 503-04.
15. Id. at 506. "Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it." Id.
16. Id. at 509.
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company town indistinguishable from any other municipality but for the fact
that title was vested in private hands. 17 Secondly, the public had virtually
unlimited access to the property since the owner had utilized part of his
holding as a commercial center.' 8 Finally, the Court noted the consequences
of the changing social and economic conditions that had fostered the growth
of privately owned municipalities in the South.' 9 On a local scale, this evolution had transformed the traditional publicly owned forums for free expression
into private property. To allow the private owner of a municipality complete
control over access to his property would be to render unattainable the first
amendment goal of maintaining a fully informed citizenry. 20 In applying
this threefold test, the Marsh Court did not characterize the presence of any
one factor as determinative. On the contrary, the decision established a
process for carefully weighing competing interests to arrive at the proper
21
accommodation between conflicting constitutional rights.
During the two ensuing decades, Marsh was the touchstone for efforts
by the courts to establish what was perceived as a necessary balance between
competing first amendment and private property rights in the shopping
center. 22 These early decisions reflected a readiness on the part of the courts
to equate, for first amendment purposes, the business district of the Marsh
company town to the suburban shopping center.2 3 In 1968 the Supreme Court
affirmed the trend toward protecting first amendment rights by extending the

17. Id. at 507-08. This aspect of the Marsh decision gave rise to the doctrine of functional equivalence. Under this doctrine, private property that assumes the characteristics
of public property to a sufficient degree is considered an appropriate first amendment
forum. For a discussion of the importance of this view in later cases dealing with the
scope of first amendment rights on private property, see Henely, supra note 12, at 79.
18. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503 (1946).
19. Id. at 508 n.5.
20. Id. at 508. Justice Reed dissented on the ground that the appellant could have
distributed her literature on a public highway a few yards from the spot where she was
arrested. Id. at 514. The majority did not address Justice Reed's view.
21. Id. at 509.
22. For a critical evaluation of the validity of extending the Marsh rationale to other
types of commercial establishments, see Comment, Picketing of the Modern Marketplace:
The Rights of Ownership and Free Speech, 48 B.U. L. RV. 669 (1968).
23. See, e.g., Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers'
Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
906 (1965) (permitting labor picketing against store in shopping center on first amendment
grounds); State v. Williams, 44 L.R.R.M. 2357 (Bait. City Crim. Ct. 1959) (first amendment
protects picketing of drugstore in shopping center); Clothing Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963) (the shopping center's
openness to the public makes it an appropriate first amendment forum); Moreland Corp. v.
Retail Store Employees Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962) (property rights
must yield to labor picketing rights when a shopping center is physically indistinguishable
from public property) (dictum). Contra, South Discount Foods, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
1552, 14 Ohio Misc. 188, 235 N.E.2d 143 (1968) (the mere resemblance of private property
to a municipality does not ipso facto convert it to public use).
These early state court decisions have been criticized for placing too much reliance on
the physical characteristics of shopping centers and for disregarding the shopping center
owner's competing property interests, S€e Note, Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v.
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rationale of Marsh beyond the context of the company town in Amalgamated
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 24 This case posed

the question of whether a state court could lawfully enjoin union organizational
picketing conducted in the confines of a privately owned shopping center.2
Viewing the primacy of naked title as the sole issue,26 the Logan Valley Court
ruled that since the shopping center was the functional equivalent of a company
town, it must be treated in substantially the same manner for first amendment
purposes.2 7 The Court looked not only to the physical similarities between the

shopping center and a town 28 but also to the fact that the premises were open
to the public to the same extent as those of a typical municipal business
district.29 In drawing this analogy, the Supreme Court took note of the social
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.: The Right to Picket on a Privately Owned Shopping Center,
73 DICK. L. REv. 519, 525 (1969).
At least one state court attempted to solve the problem of picketing on private property
solely through the principles of property law. See Nahas v. Local 905, Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 144 Cal. App. 2d 808, 301 P.2d 932 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (lessee of store in shopping
center could not maintain trespass action against labor picketers since he did not have
exclusive possession of area where picketing was conducted). This decision was criticized
on the ground that the success of a trespass action was made dependent on the party
bringing suit, the tenant of a leased store, or a shopping center owner. See Note, Shopping
Centers and Labor Relations Law, 10 STAN. L. REv. 694, 697 (1958).
Although many of these cases dealt with labor picketing or organizing activity in
shopping centers, the pre-Logan Valley period was also marked by recognition of labor
oranizational rights on private property on purely statutory grounds under the NLRA.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), a decision that predated Marsh,
had established the right of employees to conduct union organizational activity on the
property of their employer during nonworking hours. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
US. 105 (1956), recognized a similar right in non-employee union organizers when it could
be established that there existed no adequate alternative to entering the employer's
property to communicate with employees. But since an industrial plant is not open to
the public to the same extent as a business district, these decisions are distinguishable
from the cases that evolved from Marsh granting labor activities the protection of the
first amendment in shopping centers. See generally Gould, Union Organizational Rights
and the Concept of Quasi-Public Property, 49 MINN. L. REv. 505 (1965); Samoff, Picketing
and the First Amendment: Full Circle and Formal Surrender, 9 LAB. L.J. 889 (1958).
24. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). See also Comment, The Shopping Center: Quasi Public Forum
for Suburbia, 6 U. SAN FRANCTSco L. REV. 103 (1971); Note, Constitutional Law-Free
Speech on Premises of Privately Owned Shopping Center, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 612; 53 MINN. L.
REV. 873 (1969).
25. 391 U.S. at 308.
26. Id. at 324.
27. Id. at 319.
28. The majority attached no significance to the fact that the shopping center did
not include a residential district as did the Marsh company town. Instead, attention was
focused on the similarity of the business district of a municipality to a shopping center.
Id. Justice Black, author of the majority opinion in Marsh, dissented on the ground that
private property should be treated as public for first amendment purposes only when it
assumes all the characteristics of a town, including a residential district. Id. at 332. Compare
this view with his earlier statement regarding the free access to the business district of
the company town in Marsh. See note 15 supra.
29. 391 U.S. at 321. Justice White's dissenting opinion expressed concern over the
practical difficulties in implementing the test described by the majority. Since most businesses
open their parking lots and sidewalks to the public, it would be impossible to draw a line
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evolution that had spawned large numbers of privately owned business
districts and decreased the availability of traditional first amendment forums
in suburban areas. 30
The Logan Valley majority did not restrict its examination of the equities
of the case to the triad of factors considered by the Marsh Court. Rather, the
Supreme Court broadened the Marsh test to include consideration of whether
an alternative forum on public property would enable the picketers to reach
their desired audience effectively. 3 ' The public forums reasonably available
to the labor union were determined to be inadequate to meet the objectives
of the picketing.32 While the right of the union to conduct picketing under
these circumstances was upheld, the Court limited the decision to its specific
facts. Under the Logan Valley rationale, property rights of the shopping center
owner became subordinate to first amendment rights only if the message
sought to be conveyed related to the manner in which private property was
being used.33 Although Logan Valley appeared to restrict severely the rationale
of Marsh, the decision could nevertheless be justified on the basis that a case
by case approach was best suited for determining the complete scope of first
amendment rights in the shopping center.3 4
Courts in several states extended Logan Valley beyond its expressed limitation. These courts held that the first amendment protected expressive activities
in shopping centers even when the message sought to be conveyed was
unrelated to business operations.35 They concluded that the availability of a
shopping center to the public- 8 and its role as the modem suburban counterbetween shopping centers and other retail establishments. Id. at 339. He also concluded that
the rationale of the majority opinion would require a shopping center to permit communicative activity on its premises without regard to whether the activity was related to the
operation of a particular business establishment in the center. Id. at 339. Justice Harlan
in a separate dissenting opinion contended that the failure to decide the case on purely
statutory grounds under the NLRA would have an intolerably disruptive effect on the
mechanism established by Congress to resolve labor disputes. Id. at 336.
30. Id. at 324. See note 11 supra.
31. 391 US. at 322.
32. The Court determined that the shoulders of the road surrounding the shopping
center were so distant from the target store that customers could not read the picketers'
signs. Id. at 322. Requiring the union to distribute handbills on nearby public highways
would place the picketers in danger of being struck by passing cars. Id. The concern
was also expressed that picketing conducted around the perimeter of the shopping center
might be considered an illegal secondary boycott. Id. at 323 n.12. On the other hand, Justice
Black concluded that the picketing constituted an unwarranted interference with the use
and enjoyment of private property since it took place in a loading zone. Id. at 328. The
majority opinion failed to discuss the weight of the shopping center owner's competing
property interests in this regard.
33. Id. at 320.
34. See Comment, From Logan Valley Plaza to Hyde Park and Back: Shopping Centers
and Free Speech, 26 Sw. L.J. 569, 578 (1972).
35. See, e.g., Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971) (shopping center owner could not bar solicitation of
signatures on political petition unrelated to shopping center operations); State v. Miller,
280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968) (shopping center owner could not prohibit distribution
of political campaign pamphlets unrelated to shopping center operations).
36. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970) (the shopping
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part of the town center 37 dictated that a balance be struck in favor of first
amendment rights over mere assertion of title.
The Supreme Court rejected the state courts' extension of Logan Valley
in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.'8s In Lloyd shopping center owners sought to overturn a permanent injunction 3 9 barring interference with the conduct of antiwar handbilling on the premises of a large, multilevel shopping center.40
Dissolving the injunction, the Court dismissed as dictum language in Logan
Valley that referred to a shopping center as the functional equivalent of the
Marsh company town.4 1 The majority, however, stopped short of ruling that
Logan Valley had been incorrectly decided by finding that all of the criteria
of the Logan Valley test had not been satisfied by the anti-war protesters.
Since the subject matter of the handbilling was not related to the operation
of the shopping center4 2- and adequate forums on public property were
available for reaching the target audience, 43 an intrusion on private property
center, a business establishment generally open to the public, could not arbitrarily exclude
a potential customer because of his unconventional hair or dress).
37. Sutherland v. Southcen'er Shopping Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792
(1970) (since a shopping center functions as a business district in the most complete sense
of the word, the first amendment protects the circulation of a petition on its premises
even though it is unrelated to the retail function of a particular store).
38. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See generally Lewis, Free Speech and Property Rights ReEquated: The Supreme Court Ascends From Logan Valley, 24 LAB. L.J. 195 (1973); 57 MINN.
L. REy. 603 (1973); 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 427.
39. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the injunction. Tanner v. Lloyd
Corp., 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971).
40. Lloyd Center covered 50 acres of land and contained more than 60 businesses and
professional offices plus an auditorium and skating rink. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551. 571 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that Lloyd Center differed
from Logan Valley Plaza since it was larger than Logan Valley Plaza, offered a more diverse
range of professional and nonprofessional services, and was more intertwined with public
streets. Id. at 575. See Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The Demise of Logan Valley and the
Disguise of Marsh, 61 Gao. L.J. 1187, 1192-96 (1973), for a detailed description of the
role and importance of Lloyd Center in the Portland, Oregon, area.
41. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 562 (1972). The majority quoted extensively
not only from Justice Black's dissent in Logan Valley but also from Justice White's dissenting
opinion in the same case. "In no sense of the word are any parts of the shopping
center dedicated to the public for general purposes. . . . The public is invited to the
premises but only in order to do business with those who maintain establishments there."
Id. at 565.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall concluded that the majority had failed to
grasp the essence of the Logan Valley decision - that as private property expands to the
point of becoming the actual business district of a community, "the rights of the owners
to proscribe speech on the part of those invited to use the property diminish." Id. at 581
n.5. Justice Marshall's statement was in contradistinction to the majority view that "[t]he
essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not
change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping
center." Id. at 569.
42. Justice Marshall saw no reason to so limit the content of public expression in
the functional equivalent of a municipal business district. Id. at 580.
43. Id. at 567. There were 66 linear blocks of publicly owned sidewalks and a public
park inside Lloyd Center. All parties agreed that handbilling could be conducted in these
areas. The case concerned only the privately owned areas of the Center. Petition for a
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under the protection of the first amendment could not be sanctioned. In
determining that the owner of the shopping center used his property nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only, the Lloyd Court concluded that
the opening of the mall for use by selected political, charitable, and pro44
motional groups was constitutionally insignificant.
While the majority in Lloyd did not explicitly overrule Logan Valley,
it seemed incongruous that the two decisions could stand together. Lloyd
Center duplicated the role and functions of a municipality to a much greater
degree than did Logan Valley Plaza, yet only the latter had been adjudged
an appropriate first amendment forum. 45 In Logan Valley labor picketing
had been conducted in a loading zone, and it seemed likely that the union
activity had interfered with the normal use of this property. 4 The shopping
center owner in Lloyd, however, used his premises for a wide variety of

Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 5,
Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 466 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971).
44. Lloyd Center had made its premises available for the conduct of Veterans' Day
Ceremonies and school football rallies. During a National Guard weapons display, the
center had been dubbed "Camp Lloyd." The Boy Scouts had been allowed to erect a camp
and sleep inside the mall. Presidential candidates but not gubernatorial candidates bad
been permitted to give speeches in the center. The Salvation Army, Volunteers of America,
and the American Legion had solicited funds in the privately owned sections of Lloyd
Center. Hadassah, a Zionist women's organization, and the March of Dimes had been denied
this permission. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 578 (1972), and Note, supra
note 40, at 1192-93. The majority concluded that such a selection by the shopping center
management served the legitimate end of bringing shoppers into the center and of generating
good will rather than serving to open the premises to all expressive activity. Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 565 (1972). Compare this view with the comment of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals regarding a similar situation. "The admission of charity solicitors,
glee dubs, and automobile exhibitions without untoward incident evidences the ease with
which the Terminal accommodates different forms of communication. To deny access to
political communication seems to be an anomalous inversion of our fundamental values."
Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968).
45. The Lloyd decision contained extensive criticism of the Logan Valley extension of
the doctrine of functional equivalence to the shopping center. See note 41 supra. Justice
Marshall concluded that the Lloyd majority was concerned less with limiting the Logan
Valley rationale to use-related speech than with discarding the entire concept of
accommodating first amendment rights on private property. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 577 (1972). See also Comment, First Amendment Rights vs. Private Property
Rights- The Death of the Functional Equivalent, 27 MIAM L. REV. 219 (1972). Justice
Marshall felt that since there was no valid distinction between the Lloyd Center and
Logan Valley Plaza, the only legitimate way to deny first amendment protection to the
anti-war handbilling in Lloyd was to overrule Logan Valley. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 584 (1972). However, in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972),
a case decided on the same day as Lloyd, the Court seemed to reconfirm the viability of
functional equivalency. The Central Hardware Court determined that the first amendment
did not protect union organizational activity conducted in the parking lot of an individual
store. Id. at 547. Justice Powell, author of the Lloyd decision, stated that the owner of
private property was subject to the commands of the first amendment only when his
property assumed "to some significant degree the functional attributes of public property
devoted to public use." Id.
46. See note 32 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss4/8

8

Gibson: Constitutional Law--Freedom of Speech: Property Rights Triumphant
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIHI

expressive purposes potentially more distractive to his customers than the
distribution of handbills, which the Court had ruled constitutionally impermissible. 47 Paradoxically, picketing intended to impair the full enjoyment of private property by causing economic harm to a target business had
been accorded first amendment protection, but neutral and nondisruptive
48
free speech had not been similarly treated.
Moreover, the legitimacy of maintaining the salient feature distinguishing
the cases- the relevance of the subject matter of expression to the use of the
shopping center- was called into question by Police Dep't v. Mosley. 49 The
Court in Mosley determined that a municipal ordinance that permitted labor
picketing on public school grounds but prohibited all other expressive activities violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 50 Since
municipal governments could not regulate the subject matter of peaceful
protest on public property, it followed that a similar prohibition should also
apply to the owner of quasi-public property who stands "in the shoes of the
state." 51
The instant case resolved these contradictions by rejecting the concept
that a shopping center should be treated as public property for first amendment
purposes. The Court based its opinion on the proposition that the first amendment right of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by state or
federal government. 52 Describing Marsh as a limited exception to this rule,
the majority concluded that a large, self-contained shopping center is private
5
property like any other and not the functional equivalent of a municipality. 3
Private property becomes public for first amendment purposes only when it
assumes all of the characteristics of property normally devoted to the public
use. 54 The shopping center owner may therefore impose a total ban on
the conduct of expressive activities on his property. 55
As a further basis for overruling Logan Valley, the instant Court stated
that even if a shopping center could be properly equated with a municipality,
the control of speech on quasi-public property through regulation of its
contents would violate the fourteenth amendment equal protection clausesG
47. See note 43 supra.
48. See Comment, supra note 34, at 586-87.
49. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
50. Id.
51. This description of the owner of quasi-public property was used by Justice Powell
in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).
52. 96 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (1976).
53. In support of this argument, the majority quoted at length from Justice Black's
dissent in Logan Valley limiting Marsh to the company town context. Id. at 1034-35.
54. 96 S. Ct. at 1035. Some shopping center complexes do appear to have become
private cities. For example, New York's Co-op City contains a high school, two intermediate
schools, two elementary schools, seven religious congregations, 150 community organizations,
and accommodations for 150,000 residents. Note, supra note 40, at 1218 n.246. The Marsh
rationale should still apply to such extensive complexes.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 1037.
56. Id. at 1036. The majority conceded that Lloyd had not explicitly overruled Logan
Valley but insisted that the ultimate holding in Lloyd was tantamount to a rejection of
the earlier case. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice White rejected this part of the
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Notwithstanding the fact that labor picketing is directed against the manner
of operation of a particular store in a shopping center, a union must rely
solely on the statutory protection of the National Labor Relations Act to
secure its right to picket on private property. 57 Other groups without the
statutory protection available to labor thus have no right to conduct speechrelated activities in a shopping center so long as the owner uses his property
exclusively for private purposes.58
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, expressed the view that although
Lloyd had overly restricted the applicability of Logan Valley, the two decisions
were still compatible.59 The public has a substantial interest in communicating
on topics that concern the operations of the modem suburban shopping
center. 60 Since the shopping center itself is often the only reasonably effective
channel for communicating on these- topics, the shopping center owner may
effectively surpress any protest against the manner in which his property is
utilized.61 The dissent felt that Lloyd prevented such a consequence by preserving the rationale of Logan Valley when the subject matter of expressive
activity dealt with the functions of a shopping center.62 Justice Marshall rejected the majority's argument that such a test based on speech content was
unconstitutional. Under the Logan Valley rationale, the content of expression
majority's opinion and found it unnecessary to inter Logan Valley in the instant case.
Id. at 1039. He was in favor of denying the picketers the protection of the first amendment
on the ground that the subject matter of protest dealt with the operation of the Butler
Shoe Co. warehouse and not the retail store located in the shopping center. Id. See note 1
supra. Justice Powell, the author of Lloyd, issued a separate concurring opinion in which
he agreed that Lloyd did not overrule Logan Valley, but he welcomed the result reached
by the majority as representing a needed clarification of whether labor law or first amendment principles applied in cases dealing with labor picketing in shopping centers. 96 S. Ct.
at 1038.
57. In remanding the case for reconsideration under NLRA criteria alone, Justice
Stewart distinguished the facts of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (see
note 23 supra) from those of the instant case: Lawful strike activity was involved in the
instant case rather than organizational activity as in Babcock; the union activity was conducted by employees and not by nonunion employee organizers as in Babcock; and the
union activity in the instant case was conducted on the property of someone other than
an employer. Id. at 1037-38. Thus, the Court indicated that a new NLRA standard must
be established for determining the scope of §7 rights in the shopping center. Reliance
on Babcock alone will no longer be considered sufficient. Justice Marshall's dissenting
opinion disagreed with this approach and would have affirmed the court of appeals decision
under Babcock. Id. at 1044.
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's view that the decision of the court
of appeals was based at least in part on first amendment grounds rather than on purely
statutory (NLRA) criteria. Id. at 1040. Marshall felt that the Fifth Circuit's use of a first
amendment standard to determine the scope of §7 rights in the shopping center did not
inject a constitutional issue into the case. Id. at 1041-42. He concluded that the majority
unnecessarily reached a constitutional issue to overrule Logan Valley. Id. at 1042. See also
text accompanying note 4 supra.
58. 96 S. Ct. at 1033.
59. Id. at 1044,
60. Id. at 1048. Justice Brennan joined in the dissent, Justice Stevens took no part
in the decision.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1046.
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was merely a single factor in a broad formula for determining if a shopping
center was an appropriate first amendment forum in a particular factual
context.6 3 The dissent also stressed that the equal protection objective of
preventing government censorship was not at issue in Logan Valley or the
instant case;6 4 instead, the precise question before the Court was whether a
private entity should be permitted to possess a monopoly on the most effective
channels of communication in a community.65 Justice Marshall concluded
that the majority's failure to recognize this fact was caused by adherence to
an "overly formalistic" view of the relationship between private property
rights and the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. 66
Through the hasty burial of Logan Valley 7 and the restriction of Marsh,
the instant case severed the philosophical root of the decisional law that
emphasized the desirability of maintaining effective first amendment forums
for those societal groups without access to the mass media. By refusing to
recognize the new role of the shopping center as the hub of economic and
social activity in the suburban community, the Court reduced the effectiveness
of those modes of communication that had been earlier described as "essential
68
to the poorly financed causes of little people."
The decision in the principal case was reached without examining the
weight of the interests of the shopping center owner in excluding all
expressive activities from his premises. When these countervailing interests
have been described, the argument for preserving the sharp distinction between
public and private property in the shopping center context has been less
than convincing.69 Neither the possibility of increased costs for litter collection70 nor the undocumented assertion that distraction of the consumer
63. Id. at 1047.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. "Turning to the constitutional issue resolved by the Court, I cannot escape the
feeling that Logan Valley has been laid to rest without ever having been accorded a proper
burial." Id. at 1044 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
68. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (invalidating a municipal
ordinance imposing a total ban on handbilling on private residential property; such a decision
should be left to the individual property owner).
69. The shopping center owner in Lloyd, for example, objected to allowing handbilling
on his premises because it was controversial, distracting, and detrimental to business and
because of the littering caused by discarded handbills. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). On the other hand, the owner stated that he had
allowed use-related handbilling in his shopping mall after the Logan Valley decision but
did not describe any adverse effects of this policy on his business. Id. Shopping center
owners seem to have concluded that some accommodation of speech activities could be
made without unduly interfering with other uses of their property. "A shopping center,
which falls somewhere between the extremes of a company town and a private residence,
is neither absolutely subject to the control of the owner nor is it absolutely open to all
those wishing to engage in speech activities." Id. at 9. "We set up rules for the center to be
a community forum on the theory that these troubles were not going to go away and we
might as well control them." Comment, supra note 34, at 587 n.172 (quoting the statement
of a shopping center manager to the trade journal, CHAIN STORE AGE).
70. Littering alone is not sufficient reason to restrict first amendment activity on
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